Did a WW2 battlefield visit in Abucay, Bataan, in what was called Abucay Hacienda back then.
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Here's a little background info:
General Parker had recognized the gravity of his position almost as soon as the 51st sector gave way. At about 1200 of the 16th he had ordered Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough to move his Philippine Division (less the 57th Infantry) to the left of the 41st Division and to counterattack the next morning with two regiments abreast. The 31st Infantry (US)-not to be confused with the 31st Infantry (PA), a regiment of the Philippine Army's 31st Division which was also in the II Corps sector at this time- moved out early in the afternoon and about 1900 reached its destination, approximately one mile east of Abucay Hacienda. The 45th Infantry (PS) left its bivouac area at 1700 of the 16th but lost its way and when the counterattack began the next morning it was about 5,000 yards to the southeast.
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At 0815, 17 January, the American troops of the 31st Infantry, led by Col. Charles L. Steel, jumped off from the line of departure and advanced north along Trail 12, nearly a mile east of Abucay Hacienda. On the left was the 1st Battalion; next to it, astride and to the right of the trail, was the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was in reserve. The 1st Battalion on the left met little opposition and was able to reach the Balantay River by nightfall. The 2d Battalion on the right was not so fortunate. About 400 yards from the line of departure it encountered enemy resistance and, despite numerous attempts to break through, was unable to advance farther that day. To fill the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions, which had developed as a result of the unimpeded advance on the left, Company K from the reserve battalion was sent into the line.50
Plans for the next day's action were drawn up at a predawn conference held at the 41st Division command post. Present at the meeting were General Lough, Philippine Division commander; Col. Malcolm V. Fortier, 41st Division senior instructor; Col. Thomas W. Doyle, commander of the 45th Infantry, which had finally reached the scene; and Colonel Steel of the 31st. After some discussion it was agreed that a co-ordinated attack by all present would be made that morning. The 31st Infantry was to attack north, and the 45th, echeloned by battalion to the right rear, would deliver the main assault between the 31st and 43d to the right. The 43d Infantry was to maintain its position along the regimental reserve line. Artillery support for the advance would be furnished by 41st Division artillery.
As his 45th Infantry moved forward to the line of departure early on the morning of the 18th, Colonel Doyle learned that the 1st Battalion of the 31st was under strong enemy pressure and in danger of being outflanked. A hurried conference between Doyle and Steel produced a revised plan of operations. The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, was now to move to the left of the 31st Infantry, supporting the 1st Battalion of that regiment on the extreme left of the Abucay line. The rest of the units would continue the attack as planned.
The 45th Infantry attack began later than planned, but proceeded without major mishap. The regiment-less the 3d Battalion, which had lost its way and overshot the mark-advanced between the 31st and 43d but was unable to reach its objective, the Balantay River, before dark. The 3d Battalion, after a false start which found it "climbing the backs" of the 31st Infantry's left company, finally reached the river by 1630. There it settled down to hold a front of 1,400 yards, with no protection on its left except that offered by the jungle. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, to its right was at the river line, but the 2d Battalion was still short of the river, as were the 45th Infantry elements to its right. Thus at the end of the second day of counterattack the Japanese still held the salient above Abucay Hacienda.
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On the 19th the American and Scout regiments resumed the attack. Starting just before noon the 31st Infantry hit the enemy salient only to be repulsed. Time after time the American infantrymen re-formed and attacked, but with no success. Efforts to bring tanks into the action failed when Parker's request for tank support was refused on the ground that the terrain was unsuitable for tank operations. Sending armor into such an engagement, wrote Weaver, would be "like sending an elephant to kill flies."51 On the west, the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, now attached to the 31st Infantry, was under fire throughout the day from troops of the 141st Infantry who had infiltrated into the American line. Only on the right did the Philippine Division make progress that day. There, elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 45th Infantry, were able to reach the Balantay early in the afternoon.
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On 20 and 21 January the Americans and the Scouts again made numerous unsuccessful efforts to restore the original line. The terrain, dense vegetation, and the lack of accurate information about the enemy prevented effective co-ordinat